Digital fingerprinting is a framework for marking media files, such as images, music, or movies, with user-specific signatures to deter illegal distribution. Multiple users can collude to produce a forgery that can potentially overcome a fingerprinting system. This paper proposes an equiangular tight frame fingerprint design which is robust to such collusion attacks. We motivate this design by considering digital fingerprinting in terms of compressed sensing. The attack is modeled as linear averaging of multiple marked copies before adding a Gaussian noise vector. The content owner can then determine guilt by exploiting correlation between each user's fingerprint and the forged copy. The worst case error probability of this detection scheme is analyzed and bounded. Simulation results demonstrate that the average-case performance is similar to the performance of orthogonal and simplex fingerprint designs, while accommodating several times as many users.
I. INTRODUCTION
D IGITAL media protection has become an important issue in recent years, as illegal distribution of licensed material has become increasingly prevalent. A number of methods have been proposed to restrict illegal distribution of media and ensure only licensed users are able to access it. One method involves cryptographic techniques, which encrypt the media before distribution. By doing this, only the users with appropriate licensed hardware or software have access; satellite TV and DVDs are two such examples. Unfortunately, cryptographic approaches are limited in that once the content is decrypted (legally or illegally), it can potentially be copied and distributed freely.
An alternate approach involves marking each copy of the media with a unique signature. The signature could be a change in the bit sequence of the digital file or some noise-like distortion of the media. The unique signatures are called fingerprints, by analogy to the uniqueness of human fingerprints. With this approach, a licensed user could illegally distribute the file, only to be implicated by his fingerprint. The potential for prosecution acts as a deterrent to unauthorized distribution.
Fingerprinting can be an effective technique for inhibiting individual licensed users from distributing their copies of the media. However, fingerprinting systems are vulnerable when multiple users form a collusion by combining their copies to create a forged copy. This attack can reduce and distort the colluders' individual fingerprints, making identification of any particular user difficult. Some examples of potential attacks involve comparing the bit sequences of different copies, averaging copies in the signal space, as well as introducing distortion (such as noise, rotation, or cropping).
There are two principal approaches to designing fingerprints with robustness to collusions. The first approach uses the marking assumption [1] : that the forged copy only differs from the colluders' copies where the colluders' copies are different (typically in the bit sequence). In many cases, this is a reasonable assumption because modifying other bits would likely render the file unusable (such as with software).
Boneh and Shaw proposed the first-known fingerprint design that uses the marking assumption to identify a member of the collusion with high probability [1] . Boneh and Shaw's method incorporates the results of Chor et al., who investigated how to detect users who illegally share keys for encrypted material [2] . Schaathun later showed that the Boneh-Shaw scheme is more efficient than initially thought and proposed further improvements [3] . Tardos also proposed a method with significantly shorter code lengths than those of the Boneh-Shaw procedure [4] . Several recent works investigate the relationship between the fingerprinting problem and multiple access channels, and they calculate the capacity of a "fingerprint channel" [5] - [8] . Barg et al. also developed "parent-identifying" codes under a relaxation of the marking assumption [9] , and there have been a number of other works developing special classes of binary fingerprinting codes, including [10] - [15] .
The second major approach uses the distortion assumption-this is the assumption we will use. In this regime, fingerprints are noise-like distortions to the media in signal space. In order to preserve the overall quality of the media, limits are placed on the magnitude of this distortion. The content owner limits the power of the fingerprint he adds, and the collusion limits the power of the noise they add in their attack. When applying the distortion assumption, the literature typically assumes that the collusion linearly averages their individual copies to forge the host signal. Also, while results in this domain tend to accommodate fewer users than those with the marking assumption, the distortion assumption enables a more natural embedding of the fingerprints, i.e., in the signal space.
Cox et al. introduced one of the first robust fingerprint designs under the distortion assumption [16] ; the robustness was later analytically proven in [17] . Ergun et al. then showed that for any fingerprinting system, there is a tradeoff between the probabilities of successful detection and false positives imposed by a linear-average-plus-noise attack from sufficiently large collusions [18] . Specific fingerprint designs were later studied, including orthogonal fingerprints [19] and simplex fingerprints [20] . There are also some proposed methods motivated by CDMA techniques [21] , [22] . Jourdas and Moulin demonstrated that a high rate can be achieved by embedding randomly concatenated, independent short codes [23] . Kiyavash and Moulin derived a lower bound on the worst case error probabilities for designs with equal-energy fingerprints [24] . An error probability analysis of general fingerprint designs with unequal priors on user collusion is given in [25] . Some works have also investigated fingerprint performance under attack strategies other than linear averaging [26] , [27] and under alternative noise models [28] .
When working with distortion-type fingerprints, some embedding process is typically needed. This process is intended to make it difficult for the colluders to identify or distort fingerprints without significantly damaging the corresponding media in the process. For instance, if the identity basis is used as an orthogonal fingerprint design, then three or more colluders can easily identify and remove their fingerprints through comparisons. Indeed, different signal dimensions have different perceptual significance to the human user, and one should vary signal power strengths accordingly. There is a large body of work in this area known as watermarking, and this literature is relevant since fingerprinting assigns a distinct watermark to each user. As an example, one method of fingerprint embedding is known as spread spectrum watermarking. Inspired by spread spectrum communications [29] , this technique rotates the fingerprint basis to be distributed across the perceptually significant dimensions of the signal [16] . This makes fingerprint removal difficult while at the same time maintaining acceptable fidelity. For an overview of watermarking media, see [30] and [31] .
This paper proposes equiangular tight frames (ETFs) for fingerprint design under the distortion assumption. To be clear, a frame is a collection of vectors with frame bounds that satisfy for every . If each has unit norm, we say forms a unit norm frame. In the special case where , the collection is said to be a tight frame. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 1: An ETF is a unit norm tight frame with the additional property that there exists a constant such that for every pair .
In considering ETFs for fingerprint design, we analyze their performance against the worst case collusion. Moreover, through simulations, we show that these fingerprints perform comparably to orthogonal and simplex fingerprints on average, while accommodating several times as many users. Li and Trappe [22] also used fingerprints satisfying the Welch bound, but did not use tight frames, designed the decoder to return the whole collusion, and did not perform worst case analysis. Use of compressed sensing for fingerprint design was first suggested in [32] and [33] , followed by [34] . However, the work in [33] and [34] was focused on detection schemes with Gaussian fingerprints. Additionally, Colbourn et al. [35] examined combinatorial similarities of fingerprint codes and compressed sensing measurement matrices.
We present the description of the fingerprinting problem in Section II. In Section III, we discuss this problem from a compressed sensing viewpoint and introduce the ETF fingerprint design. Using this design, we consider a detector which determines guilt for each user through binary hypothesis testing, using the correlation between the forged copy and the user's fingerprint as a test statistic. In Section IV, we derive bounds on the worst case error probability for this detection scheme assuming a linear-average-plus-noise attack. Finally, in Section V, we provide simulations that demonstrate the average-case performance in comparison to orthogonal and simplex fingerprint designs.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
In this section, we describe the fingerprinting problem and discuss the performance criteria we will use in this paper. We start with the model we use for the fingerprinting and attack processes.
A. Mathematical Model
A content owner has a host signal that he wishes to share, but he wants to mark it with fingerprints before distributing. We view this host signal as a vector , and the marked versions of this vector will be given to users. Specifically, the th user is given by (1) where denotes the th fingerprint. We assume the fingerprints have equal energy (2) i.e., denotes the average energy per dimension of each fingerprint.
We wish to design the fingerprints to be robust to a linear averaging attack. In particular, let denote a group of users who together forge a copy of the host signal. Then, their linear averaging attack is of the form (3) where is a noise vector introduced by the colluders. We assume is Gaussian noise with mean zero and variance , i.e., is the noise power per dimension. The relative strength of the attack noise is measured as the watermark-to-noise ratio (WNR)
This is analogous to the signal-to-noise ratio. See Fig. 1 for a schematic of this attack model.
B. Detection
Certainly, the ultimate goal of the content owner is to detect every member in a forgery coalition. This can prove difficult in practice, though, particularly when some individuals contribute little to the forgery, with . However, in the real world, if at least one colluder is caught, then other members could be identified through the legal process. As such, we consider focused detection, where a test statistic is computed for each user, and we perform a binary hypothesis test for each user to decide whether that particular user is guilty.
With the cooperation of the content owner, the host signal can be subtracted from a forgery to isolate the fingerprint combination
We refer to as the noiseless fingerprint combination. The test statistic for each user is the normalized correlation function (5) where is the fingerprint energy (2). For each user , let denote the guilty hypothesis and denote the innocent hypothesis . Letting denote a correlation threshold, we use the following detector:
.
To determine the effectiveness of our fingerprint design and focused detector, we will investigate the corresponding error probabilities.
C. Error Analysis
Due in part to the noise that the coalition introduced to the forgery, there could be errors associated with our detection method. One type of error we can expect is the false-positive error, whose probability is denoted , in which an innocent user ( ) is found guilty ( ). This could have significant ramifications in legal proceedings, so this error probability should be kept extremely low. The other error type is the false-negative error, whose probability is denoted , in which a guilty user is found innocent ( ). The probabilities of these two errors depend on the fingerprints , the coalition , the weights , the user , and the threshold We will characterize the worst case error probabilities over all possible coalitions and users.
We first define the probability of a "false alarm"
This is the probability of wrongly accusing the innocent user who looks most guilty. Equivalently, this is the probability of accusing at least one innocent user. The worst case type I error probability is given by (8) Next, consider the probability of a "miss" This is the probability of not accusing the most vulnerable guilty user. Equivalently, this is the probability of not detecting any colluders. Note that this event is the opposite of detecting at least one colluder
The worst case type II error probability is given by
The worst case error probability is the maximum of the two error probabilities (8) and (10) The threshold parameter can be varied to minimize this quantity, yielding the minmax error probability (11) In Section IV, we will analyze these error probabilities. We will also investigate average-case performance using simulations in Section V.
III. ETF FINGERPRINT DESIGN
In this section, we introduce a fingerprint design based on ETFs. Before we discuss the design, we first motivate it in terms of a certain geometric figure of merit that originated in [20] to evaluate simplex fingerprints.
A. Geometric Figure of Merit
For each user , consider the distance between two types of potential collusions: those of which is a member, and those of which is not. Intuitively, if every noiseless fingerprint combination involving is distant from every fingerprint combination not involving , then even with moderate noise, there should be little ambiguity as to whether the th user was involved or not.
To make this precise, for each user , we define the "guilty" and "not guilty" sets of noiseless fingerprint combinations In words, is the set of size-fingerprint combinations of equal weights ( ) which include , while is the set of combinations which do not include . Note that in our setup (3), the 's were arbitrary nonnegative values bounded by one. We will show in Section IV that the best attack from the collusion's perspective uses equal weights ( ) so that no single colluder is particularly vulnerable. For this reason, we use equal weights to obtain bounds on the distance between these two sets, which we define to be (12) In this section, we will find a lower bound on this distance by exploiting specially designed properties of the fingerprints.
B. Applying the Restricted Isometry Property (RIP)
In this section, we introduce some ideas from the compressed sensing literature. To motivate our use of these ideas, we take a brief detour from our goal of focused detection. For the moment, suppose we wish to identify the entire collusion, as opposed to just one member of the collusion. To do this, we consider a matrix-vector formulation of the attack (3) without noise, i.e., with . Specifically, let denote the matrix whose columns are the fingerprints , and let the vector denote the weights used in the collusion's linear average. Note that is zero if user is innocent; otherwise, it is given by the corresponding coefficient in (3). This gives Using this representation, the detection problem can be interpreted from a compressed sensing perspective. Namely, is a -sparse vector that we wish to recover. Under certain conditions on the matrix , we may "sense" this vector with measurements in such a way that the -sparse vector is recoverable; this is the main idea behind compressed sensing. In particular, the vector is recoverable when the matrix satisfies the following matrix property.
Definition 2:
We say an matrix satisfies the RIP if there exists a constant such that (13) for every -sparse vector . The RIP was introduced in [36] to recover sparse vectors using linear programming. Since then, RIP has proven to be particularly ubiquitous across compressed sensing, enabling reconstruction guarantees for a variety of alternatives to linear programming, see, e.g., [37] and [38] . Thus, if satisfies RIP (13), we can recover the -sparse vector using any of these techniques. In fact, for the attack model with adversarial noise, , if satisfies RIP (13), linear programming will still produce an estimate of the sparse vector [39] . However, the distance between and will be on the order of ten times the size of the error . Due to potential legal ramifications of false accusations, this order of error is not tolerable. This is precisely the reason we prefer focused detection (6) over identifying the entire collusion.
Regardless, we can evaluate fingerprints with the RIP in terms of our geometric figure of merit. Without loss of generality, we assume the fingerprints are unit norm; since they have equal energy , the fingerprint combination can be normalized by before the detection phase. With this in mind, we have the following lower bound on the distance (12) between the "guilty" and "not guilty" sets corresponding to any user .
Theorem 3: Suppose fingerprints
satisfy the RIP (13) . Then (14) Proof: Take such that and . Then, the left-hand inequality of the RIP (13) gives (15) For a fixed , we will find a lower bound for
Since we can have , we know when (16) is minimized. That said, must be as small as possible, i.e., . Thus, when (16) is minimized, we must have i.e., must be as large as possible. Since , we have . Therefore (17) Substituting (17) into (15) gives
Since this bound holds for every , , and with , we have (14) .
Note that (14) depends on
, and so it is natural to ask how small can be for a given fingerprint design. Also, which matrices even satisfy RIP (13)? Unfortunately, certifying RIP is NP-hard in general [40] , [41] , but when is sufficiently small, RIP can be demonstrated in terms of a certain coherence parameter. Specifically, the worst case coherence is the largest inner product between any two distinct fingerprints (18) Intuitively, we want this value to be small, as this would correspond to having the fingerprints spaced apart. In fact, the Gershgorin circle theorem can be used to produce the following well-known bound on in terms of worst case coherence (see [42] for details):
Lemma 4: Given a matrix with unit-norm columns, then (19) where is the worst case coherence (18) .
Combining Theorem 3 and Lemma 4 yields a coherencebased lower bound on the distance between the "guilty" and "not guilty" sets corresponding to any user .
Theorem 5: Suppose fingerprints
are unitnorm with worst case coherence . Then (20) We would like to be small, so that the lower bound (20) is as large as possible. But for a fixed and , the worst case coherence of unit-norm fingerprints cannot be arbitrarily small; it necessarily satisfies the Welch bound [43] Equality in the Welch bound occurs precisely in the case where the fingerprints form an ETF [44] .
One type of ETF has already been proposed for fingerprint design: the simplex [20] . The simplex is an ETF with and . In fact, Kiyavash et al. [20] give a derivation for the value of the distance (12) in this case (21) The bound (20) is lower than (21) by a factor of , and for practical cases in which , they are particularly close. Overall, ETF fingerprint design is a natural generalization of the provably optimal simplex design of [20] .
C. Sufficiency of Deterministic ETFs
Theorem 3 gives that RIP fingerprints suffice to separate the "guilty" and "not guilty" sets for every user . Intuitively, this allows law enforcement to deliver sound accusations, provided the noise used by the collusion is sufficiently small. As such, we naturally seek RIP matrices. To this end, random matrices are particularly successful: For any , there exists a constant such that if , then matrices of Gaussian or Bernoulli ( ) entries satisfy RIP with high probability. However, as mentioned in the previous section, checking if a given matrix satisfies RIP is computationally difficult [40] , [41] ; there is no known efficient procedure to verify that a randomly generated matrix satisfies RIP for the large values of that probabilistic constructions provide.
Fortunately, there are some deterministic constructions of RIP matrices, such as [45] and [46] . However, the performance, measured by how large can be, is not as good as the random constructions; the random constructions only require , while the deterministic constructions require . The specific class of ETFs additionally requires [44] . Whether scales as versus is an important distinction between random and deterministic RIP matrices in the compressed sensing community [47] , since users seek to minimize the number of measurements needed to sense -sparse signals. However, this difference in scaling offers no advantage for fingerprinting. Indeed, Ergun et al. showed that for any fingerprinting system, a collusion of size is sufficient to overcome the fingerprints [18] . This means with such a , the detector cannot, with high probability, identify any attacker without incurring a significant false-alarm probability (7) . This constraint is more restrictive than deterministic ETF constructions, as . In this way, it appears that random fingerprints are not necessary, as they offer no apparent advantage over deterministic ETF constructions. In fact, Section V illustrates that deterministic ETFs tend to perform slightly better than random fingerprints. This marks a significant difference between compressed sensing and the fingerprinting problem.
Ergun's bound indicates that with a large enough , colluders can overcome any fingerprinting system and render our detector unreliable. As an aside, the following lemma shows that if is sufficiently large, the colluders can exactly recover the original signal . 
D. Construction of ETFs
Having established that deterministic RIP constructions are sufficient for fingerprint design, we now consider a particular method for constructing ETFs. Note that Definition 1 can be restated as follows: An ETF is an matrix which has orthogonal rows of equal norm and unit-norm columns whose inner products have equal magnitude. This combination of row and column conditions makes ETFs notoriously difficult to construct in general, but a relatively simple approach was recently introduced in [46] . The approach uses a tensor-like combination of a Steiner system's adjacency matrix and a regular simplex, and it is general enough to construct infinite families of ETFs. We illustrate the construction with an example.
Example 1 (See [46] ): To construct an ETF, we will use a simple class of Steiner systems, namely -Steiner systems, and Hadamard matrices with rows. In particular, -Steiner systems can be thought of as all possible pairs of a -element set [48] , while a Hadamard matrix is a square matrix of 's with orthogonal rows [48] . In this example, we take . The adjacency matrix of the -Steiner system has rows, each indicating a distinct pair from a size-4 set (22) To be clear, we use " " to represent and an empty space to represent a 0 value. Also, one example of a 4 4 Hadamard matrix is (23) We now build an ETF by replacing each of the " " entries in the adjacency matrix (22) with a row from the Hadamard matrix (23) . This is done in such a way that for each column of , distinct rows of are used; in this example, we use the second, third, and fourth rows of . After performing this procedure, we normalize the columns, and the result is a real ETF of dimension with fingerprints (see Fig. 2 ). We will use this method of ETF construction for simulations in Section V. Specifically, our simulations will let the total number of fingerprints range from to , a significant increase from the conventional simplex and orthogonal fingerprints. Note, however, that unlike simplex and orthogonal fingerprints, there are limitations to the dimensions that admit real ETFs. For instance, the size of a Hadamard matrix is necessarily a multiple of 4, and the existence of Steiner systems is rather sporadic. Fortunately, identifying Steiner systems is an active area of research, with multiple infinite families already characterized and alternative construction methods developed [46] , [49] . Also, it is important to note that the sporadic existence of ETFs will not help colluders determine the fingerprint marking, since the same random factors used in conventional orthogonal and simplex fingerprints can also be employed with ETFs in general. For example, we can randomly orient our ETF fingerprints by randomly drawing an orthogonal matrix and using the columns of as fingerprints; note that is still an ETF by Definition 1, but these new fingerprints enjoy some degree of randomness.
IV. ERROR ANALYSIS

A. Analysis of Type I and Type II Errors
We now investigate the worst case errors involved with using ETF fingerprint design and focused correlation detection under linear averaging attacks. Recall that the worst case type I error probability (8) is the probability of falsely accusing the most guilty-looking innocent user. Also recall that the worst case type II error probability (10) is the probability of not accusing the most vulnerable guilty user. (6) is where is the projection of noise onto the normed vector , and, due to symmetry of the variance of in all dimensions,
. Thus, under hypothesis , . We can subtract the mean and divide by the standard deviation to obtain (24) Note that is a decreasing function. The bound (24) is obtained by setting all of the coefficients of the coherence to be positive.
Likewise, under hypothesis , the test statistic is
Thus, under hypothesis Since , the type II error probability can be bounded as
We can now evaluate the worst case errors (8) and (10) . For type I errors, with
For type II errors
The last equation follows since once the 's are fixed, the actual coalition does not matter.
We can further maximize over all possible weightings Thus, the vector which minimizes the value of its maximum element is the uniform weight vector. This motivates the attackers' use of a uniformly weighted coefficient vector to maximize the probability that none of the members will be caught.
B. Minmax Error Analysis
From a detection standpoint, an important criterion is the minmax error probability (11) . The threshold trades off type I and type II errors. Thus, there is a value of , denoted by , which minimizes the maximum of the probabilities of the two error types. Since the bound for the type I error probability is independent of , and the bound for the type II error probability is maximized with a uniform weighting, assume this to be the case.
Theorem 8: The minmax probability of error (11) can be bounded as (25) where Note that for orthogonal and simplex fingerprints, the minmax errors are both of the form For orthogonal fingerprints [20] which is better than (the function is decreasing). For simplex fingerprints, is slightly better than both [20] Proof: The lower bound is the sphere packing lower bound [24] . For the upper bound
Since the test statistic is normally distributed with the same variance under either of the hypotheses and , the value of that minimizes this upper bound is the average of the means and , namely . Using this and recalling (2), we have
Consider the regime where is large, grows linearly or faster than , and is constant (in particular 0, so ). Then,
If
, then both bounds go to infinity so . Also, the geometric figure of merit (12) then behaves as If is proportional to , then is bounded away from 0.
We can also compute the error exponent for this test Corollary 9: If , then the error exponent is (26) Proof: The proof follows by applying the asymptotic equality as to the bounds in (25) . The bounds are asymptotically equivalent.
Note that this error exponent is the same as in the simplex case [20] . As , the error exponent (26) goes to zero.
V. SIMULATIONS
In Section IV, the worst case error probabilities were analyzed, where the worst case was over all collusions. Here, we investigate average-case behavior. We examine the probability of detecting at least one guilty user, (9) , as a function of with the false alarm (7) fixed below a threshold. The threshold can be interpreted as the (legally) allowable limit for probability of false accusation. We compare the average-case performance of ETF fingerprints, simplex fingerprints [20] , and orthogonal fingerprints [16] for four signal dimension sizes . We also examine the performance of randomly generated ETF fingerprints for . The results demonstrate that ETF fingerprints perform almost as well as both orthogonal and simplex fingerprints, while accommodating several times as many users. The results also show that randomly generated ETF fingerprints do not outperform the deterministic ETF fingerprints. We now describe the design of the simulations.
A. Design
For each signal dimension size , ETF, orthogonal, and simplex fingerprints were created. The deterministic ETF fingerprint design was constructed using the method shown in Example 1. For , a -Steiner system was used [49] , yielding fingerprints. For and , the Steiner systems were constructed using projective geometry, with and , respectively [46] . For , a -Steiner system was used, giving
fingerprints [46] . The orthogonal fingerprint design was constructed using an identity matrix. As discussed at the end of Section III, random rotations of the basis vectors can be applied in practice to hide them from attackers [16] , but this does not affect detection. For orthogonal fingerprint designs, . The simplex fingerprint design was constructed using the following method. The vectors of a regular simplex are equidistant from the center, having the same power, and have inner products equal to [50] . Sequentially set the elements in each fingerprint to satisfy constraints. For the first fingerprint, set the first coordinate to satisfy the power constraint (e.g., ) Fig. 3 . Plot of the probability of detecting at least one colluder ( ) as a function of the number of colluders ( ). The threshold is picked to be the minimum threshold to fix . The WNR is 0 dB. For the curves plotting performance of random fingerprints, the curve denotes probability of detection averaged over the random fingerprint ensembles, and the vertical bars denote maximum and minimum detection probabilities. (a) Plot for . The number of fingerprints used were 195 for the orthogonal, 196 for the simplex, and 1456 for the ETF constructions. There were 2000 random ETF ensembles generated. (b) Plot for . The number of fingerprints used were 651 for the orthogonal, 652 for the simplex, and 2016 for the ETF constructions. There were 250 random ETF ensembles generated. (c) Plot for . The number of fingerprints used were 2667 for the orthogonal, 2668 for the simplex, and 8128 for the ETF constructions. There were 30 random ETF ensembles generated. (d) Plot for . The number of fingerprints used were 8128 for the orthogonal, 8129 for the simplex, and 16 384 for the ETF constructions. and the rest of the entries as zero. To meet the inner product constraint with the first fingerprint, every remaining fingerprint has the same value as its first coordinate (e.g.,
). For the second fingerprint, set its second coordinate to meet the power constraint and the rest to be zero. Every remaining fingerprint must now have the same second coordinate to satisfy the inner product constraint with the second fingerprint. Repeating this process fills the fingerprint matrix. For simplex fingerprint designs, . For , we also generated random ETF fingerprint ensembles with the same size as the corresponding deterministic ETF. The random fingerprints were constructed by drawing i.i.d. samples from a distribution for each element and then normalizing the fingerprints. For , 2000, 250, and 30 such fingerprint ensembles were created, respectively.
For each fingerprint matrix and collusion size , over 15 000 linear collusion attacks were simulated. For each attack, of the fingerprints were randomly chosen and uniformly averaged. Next, an i.i.d. Gaussian noise vector was added with per-sample noise power , corresponding to a (4) of 0 dB [19] . The test statistic (5) was then computed for each user . For each threshold , it was determined whether there was a detection event (at least one colluder with ) and/or a false alarm (at least one innocent user with ). The detection and false alarm counts were then averaged over all attacks. The minimal value was selected for which . This induced the corresponding .
B. Results
We ran experiments with four different signal dimension sizes . The noise level was kept at . The value of varied between 1 and sufficiently large values, so approached zero. Plots for the probability of detection as a function of the size of the coalition are shown in Fig. 3(a)-(d) for , respectively. The largest values of for which at least one attacker can be caught with probability (nearly) one under the constraint are about 2, 5, 11, and 21, respectively. Overall, ETF fingerprints perform comparably to orthogonal and simplex fingerprints while accommodating many more users. Also, the randomly generated fingerprints generally performed slightly worse than the deterministic ETF fingerprints, demonstrating that random constructions do not have an advantage in terms of focused detection.
